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ABSTRACT
Global travel and transport play a critical role in the spread of infections. We see this clearly in
the first two pandemics of the 21st century: SARS and influenza H1N1-2009. Although air travel
contributed to dissemination in these two pandemics, the travel restrictions, quarantines, and
heightened vigilance which resulted had an impact on maritime health.
Seasonal, pandemic, and avian influenza have some important differences with regards to
exposure risks, infectivity, and severity. Most of the data for maritime influenza outbreaks
focus on seasonal influenza on cruise ships, but influenza among crew members occurs due
to close working conditions and is potentially preventable with staff vaccination programs. To
date, avian influenza has low human-to-human transmission; infection typically requires close
contact with poultry, but presents with severe disease and a high fatality rate. Pandemic (swine)
influenza was readily transmitted between people, including young adults, and caused severe
illness in high-risk groups including pregnant women, children, and those with co-morbidities
and obesity.
In contrast, SARS had lower infectivity compared to influenza, and a longer incubation period.
These characteristics slowed its propagation enough that outbreak control measures, such as
isolation of infected cases and quarantine of exposed but well persons, were effective in termi-
nating this pandemic. No effective vaccine exists for SARS at this time, whereas countries were
able to deploy millions of doses of pandemic influenza vaccine within 7 months after the out-
break was first recognized in Mexico. The lack of a protective vaccine and the higher case fatality
rate in SARS will mean that stringent quarantine measures may still be required for outbreak
control if SARS ever occurs again. Compliance with international health regulations, and the
ability to adapt these to maritime health needs, will be important in the shipping industry.
(Int Marit Health 2011; 62, 3: 170–175)
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INTRODUCTION
Global travel and transport play a critical role in
the spread of infections. This was clearly demon-
strated in the first two pandemics of the 21st centu-
ry: SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in
2003 and influenza A (H1N1) in 2009 (pH1N1).
Although air travel contributed greatly to rapid world-
wide dissemination through infected passengers,
the travel restrictions, quarantines, and heightened
vigilance which resulted had an impact on mari-
time health as well. This paper presents a focused
review of the actual and potential effects of SARS
and influenza in maritime health settings, incorpo-
rating two lectures given at the International Mari-
time Health Association conference in Singapore in
December 2010.
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DISCUSSION
INFLUENZA — SEASONAL, AVIAN, PANDEMIC
In preparing for influenza, it is helpful to differen-
tiate between seasonal, avian, and pandemic influ-
enza. These vary with regard to exposure risks, in-
fectivity, and severity, as well as prevention and treat-
ment measures (Table 1).
SEASONAL INFLUENZA
Influenza is one of the most significant communi-
cable diseases in maritime health, on passenger
cruise ships as well as cargo ships. In a retrospective
analysis of 49 medical logs from German cargo ships
with over 1.5 million person-days of observation, 21%
of medical visits were for communicable diseases,
yielding a rate of 45.8 consults per 100 person-years
[1]. Of the 68 outbreaks observed, 66 were acute
respiratory infections (ARI), including 12 influenza-
like illnesses (ILI). Attack rates ranged from 3–10
seafarers per ship (12–41% of the crew).
Influenza outbreaks on cruise ships are well-doc-
umented. A 12-day Baltic cruise (June 23–July 5,
2000) resulted in 45 crew out of 506 (9%) and 25
passengers out of 1311 (2%) developing ILI, and
2 out of 4 nasopharyngeal swabs tested positive for
influenza B [2, 3]. Another cruise from Sydney to
Noumea in September 2000 was affected by an in-
fluenza A and B outbreak. Of the 1100 passengers,
310 (37%) reported ILI afterwards, and 40 required
hospitalization, with 2 deaths [4]. Passengers on
cruise ships may include elderly individuals with co-
morbid illnesses who would be at higher risk for
severe illness and complications from influenza. One
study documented that 994 of 1284 passengers
(77%) on a cruise were over the age of 65; 215
(17%) of all passengers on that cruise developed
ARI [5].
The particular vulnerabilities of cruise ships to in-
fluenza include: 1) large numbers of persons in close
social contact; 2) cruise durations that are long enough
to encompass 2–4 generation times for a short-incu-
Table 1. Comparison of SARS and influenza (seasonal, avian, pandemic)
Characteristic SARS Seasonal Avian Pandemic
influenza influenza influenza
Causative SARS-CoV Influenza A/H1N1 Influenza A/H5N1 Influenza A/H1N1
pathogen   Influenza A/H3N2
Influenza B    
Incubation (median) 4 days 2 days 2 days 2 days
Incubation (range) 2–10 days 1–6 days 1–6 days 1–6 days
Areas of transmission Localized initially Ubiquitous Localized, poultry-related Localized initially,
now global
Routes of Human-human Human-human Mostly poultry-human Human-human
transmission Airborne or droplet Mostly droplet Mostly droplet Mostly droplet
Who is at Healthcare workers General population Those in close General population
risk of infection Contacts of cases   contact with poultry especially younger
      individuals
Groups at high risk  Older patients Elderly, persons Delayed Pregnant, obese,
for severe disease with co-morbidities, treatment elderly, persons
or death   pregnant   with co-morbidities
Total deaths 774 250,000–500,000 325 18,449 (6 Aug 2010)
Total cases 8098 Mill ions 556 214 countries
Case fatality rate 10% < 0.5% 58% < 0.5%
Available N o Yes Yes Yes
vaccine   Trivalent Pre-pandemic Pandemic
(includes pH1N1) H5N1 pH1N1
Effective N o Neuraminidase Neuraminidase Neuraminidase
antiviral agents   inhibitors inhibitors inhibitors
for treatment        
Effective N o Neuraminidase Neuraminidase Neuraminidase
antiviral agents   inhibitors inhibitors inhibitors
for prophylaxis  
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bation disease like influenza; 3) mixing of persons from
Northern and Southern Hemispheres where vaccina-
tion may not be available in the off-season for influen-
za transmission; and 4) fresh batches of susceptible
passengers in subsequent cruises are then exposed
to infected crew, resulting in onward transmission.
AVIAN INFLUENZA
To date, avian influenza (A/H5N1) has demon-
strated low human-to-human transmissibility [6] and
is typically acquired through close contact with in-
fected poultry. Clinical disease is usually severe, re-
sulting in respiratory failure requiring mechanical
ventilation [7]. Treatment includes early use of osel-
tamivir, but resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors
(NI) has emerged and is associated with clinical fail-
ure and fatal outcomes [8]. A pre-pandemic vaccine
is now available against H5N1 influenza, and it re-
ceived Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) appro-
val in the United States in 2007 [9].
Almost all the 556 confirmed human cases and
325 deaths from H5N1 influenza [10] have occurred
among residents in affected areas, with very few, if
any, among international travellers. The impact of
avian influenza on maritime health is, therefore, re-
latively low although it still remains a disease of inter-
national concern due to high case-fatality rates (58%).
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
The H1N1 pandemic of 2009, initially dubbed
“swine flu”, was first announced by the WHO in April
2009. Beginning in Mexico and the United States, it
spread worldwide over a period of weeks, with rapid-
ly changing source countries as risk factors for in-
troduction of the infection [11]. Initial figures sug-
gested a higher case fatality rate (CFR), prompting
the WHO to issue a pandemic alert, but subsequent
studies have indicated this pandemic to be of mild
severity with overall CFR of < 0.5% [12]. This strain,
pH1N1, was nevertheless a novel strain, with youn-
ger individuals having greater risk of acquiring infec-
tion. However, risk of severe disease and mortality
was seen in older patients as well as children under
5 years of age [13], pregnant women [13], and those
with medical co-morbidities including obesity [14].
Early treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors such
as oseltamivir was associated with reduced morbidi-
ty [15], mortality [16], and viral shedding [17]. Ho-
wever, resistance has emerged during treatment with
oseltamivir [18] or intravenous peramivir [19] and
prophylaxis with oseltamivir [20], with the H275Y
mutation conferring high level resistance against
oseltamivir, and a recently reported I223R mutation
conferring multi-drug resistance against oseltamivir,
zanamivir, and peramivir [21].
Both the WHO and the International Maritime
Association issued interim guidance for sea travel
[22, 23]. Within the past two years, more reports have
emerged documenting the spread of pandemic
H1N1-2009 influenza outbreaks on ships, including
military vessels. One retrospective study of 237 crew
on a military ship cruising in the Mediterranean (May–
–September, 2009) showed 52 reported acute respi-
ratory infections (ARI), and of the 211 results avail-
able, 39% tested seropositive for pH1N1 [24]. The
proportion of seropositives was associated with more
crowded living conditions and younger age (< 40
years), in those with ARI symptoms. Another outbreak
occurred on a Peruvian Navy ship carrying 355 crew
in June–July, 2009 [25]. Of the 85 patients who de-
veloped febrile ARI, 78 (92%) tested positive for
pH1N1 by RT-PCR, yielding an attack rate of 22% for
confirmed influenza. Attack rates were highest among
cadets and low-rank officers, as well as younger per-
sons (aged 18–25 years).
The attack rates on these 2 military vessels were
higher than in a civilian setting. An Australian study
of a cruise ship with 1970 passengers and 734 crew
showed 83 (3%) were infected with pH1N1 and 98
(3.6%) with H3N2 influenza [26]. This outbreak also
indicated that two different strains of influenza can
co-circulate onboard even in the midst of a pande-
mic. Military and cargo vessels typically have fewer
individuals at high risk for influenza complications
than cruise ships with elderly passengers, but close
working and living conditions may lead to higher at-
tack rates than on cruise ships, with adverse effects
on crew members’ ability to function effectively.
Given the risk of influenza among crew members
due to close working conditions, and risk of compli-
cations among high-risk passengers on cruise ships,
the data and experience outlined above should
prompt a review of our approach to influenza pre-
paredness. Control measures which maritime physi-
cians should consider for implementation on ships
include influenza vaccination programs for staff [27],
surveillance and diagnostic testing, isolation, qua-
rantine, hand hygiene [28], personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) [28], antiviral agents for treatment, and
post-exposure prophylaxis [29] (Table 2).
The composition of both Northern and Southern
Hemisphere vaccines for seasonal influenza has re-
mained stable from 2010–2012. As pandemic H1N1-
-2009 remains the dominant strain in circulation, the
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seasonal influenza vaccine includes the pandemic
H1N1-2009 strain in its trivalent composition, pro-
viding a wider spectrum of protective effectiveness.
In tropical and equatorial regions, influenza may cir-
culate with no distinct seasonality, unlike in tempe-
rate regions. Given potential mixing of passengers
and/or crew from both northern and southern hemi-
spheres as well as equatorial regions, the importance
of influenza vaccination to prevent cross-infection in
these congregate settings should be emphasized.
SARS: A SINGAPORE PERSPECTIVE
The SARS pandemic of 2003 was disseminated
primarily through air travel [30] rather than sea tra-
vel. However, the resulting changes in the WHO In-
ternational Health Regulations (IHR 2005) apply to
all points of entry and border controls including ports,
in order to manage public health events of interna-
tional concern [31]. Maritime physicians, therefore,
need to be aware of IHR 2005 obligations, should
SARS ever recur.
SARS transmission occurred on aircraft on several
occasions. On one 3-hour flight with an ill index case
and 119 other individuals, laboratory-confirmed
SARS developed in 16 persons, 2 others were given
diagnoses of probable SARS, and 4 were reported to
have SARS but could not be interviewed [30]. Ana-
lysis of the 22 ill cases showed that being seated in
the three rows in front of the index case conferred
a 3-fold higher risk of infection, but 90% of the ca-
ses were seated more than 3 feet away, suggesting
possible airborne rather than droplet spread. On
another flight, only 1 of 246 passengers became ill
despite 4 SARS cases on that 90-minute flight [32].
Using new techniques such as viral sequence varia-
tion (VSV) analysis, it was possible to determine retro-
spectively that the SARS-CoV infection of a German
patient had indeed been acquired on a flight shared
with a Singaporean SARS case (who had flown from
New York to Frankfurt early in the outbreak), rather
than from the patient’s own stay in Hanoi, Vietnam
[33]. Other flights with SARS cases did not result in
any documented transmission [34], indicating that
SARS is somewhat less transmissible unless patients
are coughing with high viral burden.
The lessons learnt during the SARS outbreak bear
re-visiting because SARS remains an emerging in-
fectious disease (EID) caused by a novel pathogen,
the SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV), about which much
is still unknown. Human-to-human transmission was
the most common risk factor for acquiring SARS [35]
but the originating animal reservoir for SARS remains
elusive. Initially thought to be from the palm civet cat
[36], more recent evidence indicates bats may be
the original reservoir for SARS-CoV [37, 38].
Early detection of cases remains challenging be-
cause diagnostic tests for SARS such as SARS-CoV
PCR on blood or respiratory samples can test nega-
tive in the first week of illness [39], and seroconver-
sion may not occur until the third to fourth week
after illness onset [40, 41]. Although researchers
continue to investigate the pathogenesis and immu-
nobiology of SARS, an effective vaccine for humans
is not yet available. Neither is there any antiviral agent
clearly demonstrated to be effective for treatment or
prophylaxis, although preliminary data suggest some
benefit from interferon [42]. The 10% overall case
fatality rate for SARS [32] is also higher than for pan-
demic (H1N1) influenza, although it remains lower
than for avian (H5N1) influenza.
Without a protective vaccine or effective specific
treatment, the interventions for outbreak control will
likely still be: 1) detection and isolation of infected
patients; 2) quarantine of those who are well but
exposed, for the duration of the incubation period
(2–10 days from exposure [35]); and 3) supportive
medical care for ill patients including access to me-
chanical ventilation. Within healthcare settings, use
Table 2. Influenza control measures for ships
Influenza Control Measures
Surveillance Active and passive surveillance
Standardized case definition
Diagnostic testing Rapid test kits
PCR or viral cultures for confirmation
Isolation of cases If unable to isolate, provide surgical masks and encourage hand hygiene
Antiviral agents for treatment Oseltamivir 75 mg oral twice daily ¥ 5 days
Antiviral agents for prophylaxis Oseltamivir 75 mg once daily for 10 days
Vaccination for passengers Recommended for all high-risk passengers
Vaccination for crew Attempt at least 80% coverage for crew
Int Marit Health 2011; 62, 3: 157–208
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of personal protective equipment (PPE) and restric-
tion of hospital visitors will most likely be required
again, and vigorous efforts at contact tracing in order
to implement isolation and quarantine will be required
in community settings. If or when another SARS out-
break occurs, all these heightened surveillance, isola-
tion, and quarantine measures will probably cause
travel restrictions that maritime physicians will have
to grapple with. Good risk assessment, clear commu-
nications, and coordinated follow-through are critical
to an effective outbreak response.
There are some important other differences be-
tween SARS and influenza. SARS had a lower infec-
tivity (R0) and longer incubation period compared to
influenza. Patients were also not infectious prior to
illness onset, unlike influenza. These characteristics
allowed outbreak control measures such as isolation,
quarantine, and social distancing to eventually slow
down human-to-human transmission of SARS, and
ultimately, end the pandemic.
Understanding the first two viral pandemics of this
century allows us to scan the horizon for other po-
tential emerging infectious threats. SARS remains
quiescent currently, and it is unclear if, when, or
where this virus will re-emerge to cause another out-
break. In contrast, there is a far greater burden of
disease from seasonal influenza, and the risk of pan-
demic influenza remains a concern.
Mass gatherings continue to pose a hazard with
large numbers of travellers from different regions
gathering, being exposed through the respiratory
route, and then dispersing to their respective coun-
tries. The Muslim Haj [43, 44] and the 2008 World
Youth Festival in Sydney [45] have been venues for
influenza outbreaks and dissemination of novel vi-
rus strains. The experience and perspectives gained
from recent pandemics [46, 47] will strengthen our
efforts as we seek to improve EID and pandemic pre-
paredness in maritime health.
KEY MESSAGES
1. Influenza is one of the most common health prob-
lems experienced in sea travel, for crew and pas-
sengers, with documented potential for outbreaks.
2. Influenza remains the most important vaccine-pre-
ventable respiratory infection in maritime health,
and vaccination against seasonal influenza is 70–
–90% effective in preventing infection.
3. Maritime physicians should consider other influ-
enza preparedness measures including surgical
masks, hand hygiene, diagnostic tests, and anti-
virals for treatment and prophylaxis.
4. SARS remains an emerging infection without
a protective vaccine or proven antiviral treatment;
the mainstays of outbreak control will still be ear-
ly detection and isolation of infectious cases, and
quarantine of exposed individuals.
5. Good risk assessment, clear communications, and
coordinated follow-through are critical to an ef-
fective outbreak response.
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